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Abstract
This paper investigates the e￿ect of HIV/AIDS on output in an overlapping gener-
ations economy calibrated to sub-Sahara Africa. I use skill heterogeneity as a proxy for
socioeconomic status and test scenarios where the AIDS epidemic a￿ects skills di￿er-
ently. The results indicate that the e￿ects of the epidemic are sensitive to the distribu-
tion of the disease across skills. In general, the e￿ect is much greater as the epidemic
mainly a￿ects skilled workers. Output is found to be below a no-AIDS output in a range
between 3% (10%), when only unskilled workers are a￿ected, and 10% (28%), when only
skilled workers a￿ected, whenever the overall infection rate is 7% (20%). When investi-
gating the hypothesis that AIDS a￿ects skilled workers more severely than unskilled at
the beginning of the epidemic, with the e￿ect switching as the epidemic becomes more
mature, the ￿ndings are that the economy can be 8% smaller along the transition path.
In all scenarios where the epidemic is temporary, it would take 4 to 5 generations or
about 90 years for sub-Saharan Africa to recover.
Key Words: HIV/AIDS, capital-skill complementarity, heterogeneity, and sub-Sahara
Africa.
JEL Classi￿cation: E20
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11 Introduction
AIDS killed an estimated 2.1 million people in 2007 (UNAIDS (2007)). According to
UNAIDS epidemic update for the year 2007, the number of people living with HIV
in the world is between 30.6 and 36.1 million, and the number of newly infected was
between 1.8 and 4.1 million. Within 10 years, the majority of these people will have
contracted AIDS and died. This situation is exacerbated in sub-Saharan Africa, where
two thirds of all HIV infected people live. This epidemic is unique because it mainly
kills individuals in their prime productive years, hence, the consequences of such a
disastrous event must be investigated. The question of how AIDS a￿ects output is,
therefore, extremely important.
Since the beginning of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the eighties, several studies were
conducted to investigate the possible links between the epidemic and economic growth
and well being. Most of these studies were country speci￿c and used either Solow type
growth models or computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to simulate these
e￿ects. There was also another class of papers that used regression models with cross-
sectional or panel data to investigate this relationship. With the exception of a few,
almost all these studies point towards quite large long-run e￿ects of AIDS on growth
of GDP with little e￿ect on GDP per capita. A summary of such studies can be seen
in table 1.
Hamoudi and Birdsall (2002) study the relationship between human capital accu-
mulation and AIDS. Since AIDS signi￿cantly reduces work productivity, it negatively
a￿ects human capital and, therefore, output. Another channel at which AIDS a￿ects
human capital negatively is through the increase in the orphan population since edu-
cational attainment of orphans is in general smaller compared to non-orphan children.
That is, children that have infected parents tend to drop out of school to work in order
to support their household, and upon their parent’s death, most likely will not go back
to school.
In order to capture this interaction between parents’ health status and children’s
education, Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005) use an overlapping generations frame-
work where reduced life expectancy generates reduced incentives to invest and therefore
lowers both physical and human capital accumulation with great consequences for out-
2put. This result is in large part due to lower education received by AIDS orphans.
Their main ￿ndings, as shown in table 1, is that AIDS has large growth e￿ects, but
policies to subsidize the price of treatment medication have small remedial e￿ects. This
framework is more appropriate for analyzing the long-run implications of HIV/AIDS
on growth and output.
The current paper will incorporate skill heterogeneity into the framework of Corri-
gan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005) by having an aggregate production function measur-
ing GDP as a function of current capital stock and e￿ective skilled and unskilled labor
units. Capital-skill complementarity will be assumed and HIV risk will di￿er between
skill levels. Hence, this paper will combine features from the literature on socioeco-
nomic status and AIDS with the overlapping generations setting. The main goal here is
to investigate how the relationship between AIDS prevalence and socioeconomic status
a￿ects output. I calculate transition paths after the economy is a￿ected by AIDS and
show how di￿erent these paths are with respect to di￿erent scenarios. This allows for
long-run as well as short to medium run results.
The relationship between AIDS and socioeconomic status is an important issue,
since it not only can shed some light into where preventive policies must be targeted,
but also because depending on how serious the epidemic is among skilled workers, and
given that these workers complement existing capital stock, the e￿ects of such an event
can be disastrous as in Kambou, Devarejan, and Over (1992). The literature on this
relationship is extensive and contradictory. By looking at data, there is no clear con-
sensus on how HIV/AIDS incidence is distributed across skills. Review papers such
as Hargreaves and Glynn (2002) and Wojcicki (2005) have found ambiguous results on
this relationship by searching for studies where socioeconomic status and HIV preva-
lence were investigated using population based surveys such as the demographic health
surveys (DHS).
Out of a total of 36 studies, Wojcicki (2005) cites 15 studies where no association
between socioeconomic status and AIDS was found. In 12 studies, there was a positive
association between high socioeconomic status and AIDS, and in the remaining 8 the
association was between low socioeconomic status and AIDS. Roughly the same con-
clusions are reported in Hargreaves and Glynn (2002). This apparent controversy has
found explanation in Vandermoortele and Delamonica (2000), where they claim that in
3the beginning of the epidemic, AIDS a￿ects higher skilled individuals more relative to
lower skilled; and as the epidemic runs its course and becomes more widespread, the
disease becomes more prevalent among unskilled individuals relative to skilled. Hence,
studies performed in the eighties would have di￿erent results compared to studies per-
formed in the late nineties1.
For example, using data from Rwanda, Zaire, and Zambia in the late eighties Over
(1992) and Kambou, Devarejan, and Over (1992) document that higher skilled workers
have a higher probability of infection relative to lower skilled workers. In Zambia for
the year 1985 with blood donor and hospital sta￿ data, using years of education as
the measurement of socioeconomic status, they report HIV infection rate of 33.3% for
highly educated individuals (15 years or more) and 8% for uneducated individuals (0
to 4 years). In Rwanda, for the year 1987 with urban wives data, they report infection
rates by husband’s education, monthly income of husband, and job of husband. In all
cases, the more skilled the husband, the higher the infection rate on wives. In Zaire
(1987), using textile factory urban employees data, they report infection rates of 5.3%
for executives, 4.6% for foremen, and 2.8% for workers.
Arndt and Lewis (2000), using an ING-Barings study for the year 1999 in South
Africa, report higher AIDS incidence among unskilled workers compared with skilled.
Nattrass (2003), using South African 1996 census data, reports that the projected HIV
prevalence for 2005 was 13.3% among highly skilled workers, 20.2% among skilled, and
22.8% among unskilled; also, AIDS projected prevalence for 2005 for these same cohorts
was 1.4%, 1.9%, and 2.2% respectively.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows: section 2 will present the
baseline model with its set up, equilibrium, and solution. Section 3 will calibrate the
model as to make the results applicable to sub-Saharan Africa. Section 4 will bring the
results, with section 5 concluding.
1Some empirical cross-country evidence for this claim can be found in Fylkesnes et al. (2001) and Harg-
reaves et al. (2002).
42 Model
This model extends Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005) to include skill heterogeneity
in the labor market. I will keep the notation similar to theirs as to facilitate comparison.
The set up of the model is as follows.
2.1 Set Up
Each individual lives for a maximum of three periods: youth, adulthood, and old age.
As adults, individuals will di￿er with respect to their skills. That is, an adult individual
can either be skilled or unskilled. For the purposes of this paper, every skilled individual
will carry a subscript of 1, while unskilled individuals will carry a subscript of 2. As
individuals turn old, there will be no change in skill status. The only possibility to
obtain skills in this model is by education at a young age. Educated children will
become skilled workers; the opportunity cost of this education is labor income forgone
in that particular period. I will assume that parents are the ones making educational
decisions for their children. This way, the index assigned to children will be the same
as their parents. Children, therefore, in this model can only work or learn.
However, this does not imply that as children transition to adulthood, they can’t
change status. For example, a child born in a skilled family could become an unskilled
adult if the family decides that the child has to allocate the majority of it’s time to
work. I will assume though that a child born in an unskilled household will remain
unskilled as it enters adulthood. Since all of the model’s dynamics stems from the
decisions of the adult generation, in what follows, I will discuss their behavior in detail.
Starting in period 2, individual type i learns about his health status. I will assume
that individuals are either healthy or unhealthy depending on their seroprevalence (HIV
status). Let πi
t be the probability of type i individual being infected at t, consequently
1−πi
t is the probability of remaining healthy. Note that this probability is conditional on
skill type, which gives the model the ￿exibility to study how growth e￿ects of the AIDS
epidemic depend on cross-sectional correlations between incidence and socio-economic
status.
Regardless of type or health status, all adult individuals will inelastically supply
labor to the ￿rm. Also, they will choose current consumption ct, their children’s con-
5sumption ft and education level nt which will generate the level of the child’s human
capital in the future ht+1. Healthy individuals will also choose how much to save st
given some interest rate rt+1 so as to allow them to consume in the future ct+1. Infected
individuals will die after period 2 and therefore will not save; however, they need to
choose how much to spend on HIV/AIDS related medical expenses mt. Hence, healthy
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where τt is the government’s income tax and ∆ is a parameter that captures the degree
of child’s productivity relative to that of adults. Also, old age consumption ct+1 will
be determined by,
ci
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)si
t. (4)
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where σt is the treatment subsidy provided by the government and pt is the worldwide
HIV medication price. The parameter Ψi measures the relative productivity of a sick
individual relative to that of a healthy one.













where Kt is the aggregate capital stock, L1
t is the aggregate stock of e￿ective skilled
labor, L2
t is the aggregate stock of e￿ective unskilled labor, and η and δ are parameters
measuring the income shares of all inputs. The functional form for the technology above
is a two level CES function with capital and skilled labor aggregated at the ￿rst level and
then combined with unskilled labor at the second level. Du￿y, Papageorgiou, and Perez-
Sebastian (2004) have empirically shown that this technology is the most appropriate
when confronted with cross country data. The parameters µ and φ were chosen as to
impose capital-skill complementarity in the model, that is, φ < µ. Empirical support
for the capital skill complementarity hypothesis can be found in Griliches (1969), Fallon
and Layard (1975), and Krusell et al. (2000).
In addition to assuming capital-skill complementarity, the parameters µ and φ were
chosen to make unskilled workers substitute for the capital-skill aggregate and skilled
workers and capital complements, that is, µ ∈ (0,1] and φ < 0 . Fallon and Layard
(1975) have empirically estimated these parameters to be in the ranges hypothesized
above for a sample of developing countries, and Zhou (2001) empirically concluded that
unskilled and skilled labor are substitutes in a study of Zimbabwe. Also, anecdotal
evidence for these hypotheses can be found in Amaral and Quintin (2004).
In order to completely characterize the technology above, one needs to de￿ne the
expressions for skilled and unskilled labors. E￿ective skilled labor is composed of two
types of labor: adult skilled healthy individuals and adult sick individuals. Assuming
that the e￿ective labor of an HIV infected skilled individual is a fraction (Ψ1 < 1) of
the e￿ective labor of a healthy skilled individual, we have that
L1





t is the aggregate skilled human capital at time t. This assumption also implies
that di￿erent types of skilled labor are perfect substitutes.
Perfect substitutability will also be assumed for the composition of unskilled labor.
This input is composed of 6 types of labor: adult unskilled healthy individuals and their
children, adult unskilled unhealthy individuals and their children, and the children of
7both skilled healthy and skilled sick individuals. Here, I will also assume that the
e￿ective labor of an HIV infected unskilled individual is a fraction (Ψ2 < 1) of the
e￿ective labor of a healthy unskilled individual. Also, I will assume that the e￿ective
labor of all children is a fraction (∆ < 1) of the e￿ective labor of a healthy unskilled
individual. Hence, the equation for e￿ective unskilled labor units is given by,
L2
t = [(1 − π2
t)[1 + (1 − n
2,h
t )∆] + π2












t is the aggregate unskilled human capital at time t, and ni,j is the fraction of
type i, j; where i ∈ {1,2} and j ∈ {h = healthy,s = sick}, children’s time devoted to
education.
The government will tax labor income of all adult types at a rate τi
t, but not the
income of the children. As in Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005), this assumption
captures the fact that children mostly work in the informal sector of the economy. It
will use the proceeds to ￿nance it’s own consumption and investment in some non-
productive capital Gt; and subsidize the price pt of HIV medication Mi
t at rate σt,
which will be taken as exogenous, in the form of ARV treatment. Also, the government
will balance its budget every period; hence it’s budget equation is given by













To ￿nalize the set up of the model, one still needs to de￿ne the laws of motion for
the children’s human capital accumulation. Di￿erently from Corrigan, Glomm, and
Mendez (2005), I will assume that the child’s human capital technology is only a linear






where i ∈ {1,2}, j ∈ {h,s}, and B is a productivity parameter. This functional
form will guarantee the model’s tractability of aggregate human capital (Hi
t) without
jeopardizing the results. Aggregate human capital will evolve according to:
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where children from healthy skilled parents will also be skilled, while all other children
will be unskilled.
2.2 Equilibrium
In this section I will de￿ne all adults’ maximization problems as well as the competitive
equilibrium for this model. An adult individual will have a di￿erent maximization
problem conditional on health status; however, the maximization problem is the same
conditional on type. Hence for any type i healthy individual, the maximization problem




t} subject to equations (3), (4), and
(11).
The maximization problem for HIV infected individuals of type i is to maximize




t} subject to equations (5) and (11). Given the maxi-
mization problems described above, a competitive equilibrium for this economy can be
de￿ned in the following manner:



















t=0 for sick individ-
uals, sequences of aggregate physical capital {Kt}∞
t=0, and e￿ective labors {Li
t} for all




















t } solve both skilled and unskilled sick household problems,





4. all human capital will evolve according to: hi
t+1 = Bi,jn
i,j
t for all i and j,
5. factor prices are determined by their respective factor demands’ productivity, that
is, wi
t = FLi
t and rt = FKt,
96. and the government budget constraint is cleared every period, that is,













2.3 Solving the Model



























































































which are the decision rules for old age consumption and human capital. Since sick































































































































With the decision rules regarding time spent on education, aggregate human capital
accumulation will be given by equations (12) and (13), with hi
t+1 replaced by equations
(19) and (24).
Note that some of the decision rules above still depend on the wage rate wi
t or the
subsidy rate σt and all other exogenous forces. The subsidy σt can be solved from the
government’s budget constraint (10) for any ￿xed value of pt, Gt, and wi
t; given all
other exogenous parameters. Hence, determining the wage rates for both skilled and
unskilled individuals completely solves the model.
The wage rates can be obtained from the ￿rst order condition of the ￿rm’s problem,
where each wage will equal it’s marginal product, that is
w1
t =
(1 − η)(1 − δ)[η(L2


















t are given by equations (7), (8), and (9) respectively.
3 Calibration
The parameters chosen for the simulations re￿ect roughly the economy of sub-Sahara
Africa. Table 2 contains the baseline calibrated values. As in Corrigan, Glomm, and
Mendez (2005), I impose no preference heterogeneity and choose the same parameter
values as they have for all utility functions in my model. I also follow Corrigan, Glomm,
and Mendez (2005) in my choices for taxes, and labor productivity parameters. The
choice of the labor productivity parameter Ψ is also consistent with Cuddington (1993a)
for the economy of Tanzania as well as Guinness and Alban (2000). Human capital pro-
ductivity is assumed to be the same across agents making human capital accumulation
only dependent on the parents choice of its children schooling. Sensitivity analysis will
be performed on Ψi, ∆, and Bi,j since the results could be sensitive to the choice of
these parameters.
The income share parameters η and δ are calibrated using a combination of data and
previous studies on sub-Saharan African economies. Gollin (2002) estimated income
shares for a cross section of countries and using his results for sub-Saharan African
countries only, the income share due to labor can be roughly calculated to be 0.65
(0.35 for capital). To determine what fraction of the labor income share is due to
skilled labor versus unskilled, I use the World Development Indicators database for a
poll of sub-Saharan African countries2 where data on education was available between
the years 1996 and 2008. I assume all individuals that at least completed secondary
education were skilled, which is consistent with Fallon and Layard (1975), otherwise
I put them in the unskilled category. Using each country’s labor force as weights, I
compute the labor fractions to be 0.37 for skilled and 0.63 for unskilled. In order to
determine how much each type contributes to income, I assume a wage skill premium
of 3 to 1(Mwabu and Schultz (2000)) and obtain income shares to be 0.23 for unskilled
2The list of countries used was: Ethiopia, Botswana, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
12workers and 0.42 for skilled workers. This implies that η = 0.23 since η is the coe￿cient
that corresponds to the unskilled labor share of income. The capital share of income
is 0.35, which according to the production function should equal to (1 − η)δ. Hence, δ
can be derived to be 0.45.
As mentioned before, the parameters µ and φ are selected to capture capital-skill
complementarity (µ > φ). In addition, µ is chosen to capture some degree of substi-
tutability between unskilled labor and the capital-skill aggregate, and φ is chosen as
to impose complementarity between skilled workers and capital. Another important
feature in the choice of these parameters is that they are selected as to ensure that the
model generates a wage skill premium of at least 2. Extensive sensitivity analysis was
performed on these parameters since they play a very important role in the model.
4 Computational Experiments and Results
The purpose of this section is to compute transition paths for di￿erent scenarios where
AIDS a￿ects the economy and compare output across these states relative to a hypo-
thetical no-AIDS case. Five scenarios were computed and in all the simulations, I will
let the model reach a steady state no-AIDS output ￿rst and then impose a positive
probability of infection that will vary across skills. The economy will evolve for 10
periods and output will be reported as a percentage of the no-AIDS steady state for
every generation after the shock.
The model’s share of skilled versus unskilled labor was used in order to compute the
infection probabilities as to keep the overall infection rate constant in each scenario.
Letting the disease distribution vary across skills, but keeping the mean overall infection
rate the same; that is, using mean preserving spreads, allows for an analysis of how the
distribution of the disease across skills a￿ects the economy. It will be possible then to
investigate if there are any signi￿cant di￿erences in the e￿ect of AIDS on output as one
moves from a case where only skilled people are infected to a case where only unskilled
people are infected given the same overall infection level.
In the ￿rst 2 scenarios with AIDS, I have chosen to keep HIV infection around
7%, which corresponds to the current average HIV infection prevalence in sub-Sahara
Africa (World Development Indicators) weighted by each country’s population where
13data is available3. In the next 2 scenarios the overall infection probability is 20%,
which corresponds to the levels of infection reported in southern Africa in countries like
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Zambia. Hence, it seems appropriate
to investigate scenarios where the overall probability is quite high. Scenarios 1 and
3 are attempts to compute the e￿ects of AIDS on output in a situation where there
is no cure or reduction in infection rates. These scenarios could be considered worst
case scenarios. Scenarios 2 and 4 assumes AIDS will no longer be a problem after 2
generations.
The following scenarios were considered in this experiment:
1. Scenario 1: At t = 20, the overall infection probability is 7% and remains at this
level forever. Five variations of this scenario were chosen with respect to π1 and
π2
(a) π1 = 0 and π2 = 0.129
(b) π1 = 0.035 and π2 = 0.1
(c) π1 = π2 = 0.07
(d) π1 = 0.1 and π2 = 0.044
(e) π1 = 0.152 and π2 = 0
2. Scenario 2: At t = 20 and t = 21, the overall infection probability is 7% and
returns to zero after that. The same ￿ve variations as above were chosen for π1
and π2 here.4
3. Scenario 3: At t = 20, the overall infection probability is 20% and remains at this
level forever. Five variations of this scenario were chosen with respect to π1 and
π2
(a) π1 = 0 and π2 = 0.356
(b) π1 = 0.10 and π2 = 0.269
(c) π1 = π2 = 0.20
(d) π1 = 0.295 and π2 = 0.10
3HIV prevalence data from the World Development Indicators is available for the following countries:
Ethiopia, Botswana, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia
4I will refer to each probability combination similarly to how I refer under scenario 1; that is, case 2a to
case 2e.
14(e) π1 = 0.41 and π2 = 0
4. Scenario 4: At t = 20 and t = 21, the overall infection probability is 20% and
returns to zero after that. The same ￿ve variations as in scenario 3 were chosen
for π1 and π2 here.5
5. Scenario 5: At t = 20, π1 = 0.08 and π2 = 0.024; at t = 21, π1 = 0.05 and
π2 = 0.31. After t = 21, all infection rates return to zero.
Scenario 5 captures the e￿ect of AIDS whenever the epidemic curve di￿ers in timing
across skills, that is, the epidemic a￿ects skilled individuals more heavily ￿rst relative
to unskilled and then switches to a￿ecting the unskilled more relative to skilled. That
is, the two epidemiological curves should cross at some point. It is also assumed that,
in this scenario, the overall level of infection increases from 5% to 20% in subsequent
generations. This ￿fth scenario is consistent with Vandermoortele and Delamonica
(2000) and with evidence presented in Hargreaves et al. (2002) using demographic
health survey data for an urban population in Kenya where the argument is that once
the epidemic becomes more widespread, it will a￿ect unskilled individuals more relative
to skilled since the latter have the means to protect themselves against the disease as
they learn how AIDS is transmitted. In fact, empirical studies have shown the positive
association between education, which is often used as a proxy for socioeconomic status,
and safer sexual behavior (de Walque (2006)).
The study of the e￿ects of AIDS under these di￿erent scenarios can help in answering
some important questions. For example, under scenarios 1 and 3, one can investigate
the economy’s transition path towards a new output steady state compared to the no-
AIDS case. Scenarios 2 and 4 permits one to investigate how long would it take for
an economy to recuperate from the epidemic. For purposes of interpretation, I will
de￿ne the short/medium run as generations 1 to 3 and the long-run as generation 5
and above. While, scenarios 1 and 2 can assist in predicting what future damages AIDS
can still cause giving the current situation (7% or 20% prevalence), scenario 5 can assist
in understanding the course of the epidemic and its e￿ect on output since the advent
of the disease in the late seventies and early eighties.
5I will refer to each probability combination similarly to how I refer under scenario 3; that is, case 4a to
case 4e.
15Before analyzing each scenario in detail, one way to assess the model’s overall good-
ness of ￿t is to compare its predictions about the skill premium with that of data.
Mwabu and Schultz (2000)report skill premiums for South Africa ranging between 2
and 5. Figures 1 to 5 display the skill premiums generate by the model for each scenario
before and after the epidemic. In almost all cases the skill premiums generated by the
model are consistent with Mwabu and Schultz (2000).
Table 3 presents the results for the baseline parameter values for all scenarios. Under
scenario 1, which imposes an overall infection probability of 7%, AIDS reduces output
in the ￿rst generation by 1.3% for the case where π1 = 0 and π2 = 0.129, 2.15% for the
case where π1 = π2 = 0.07, and 3.2% when π2 = 0 and π1 = 0.152. From generation 1
to generation 2, the epidemic has it’s greatest dive with the e￿ect ranging from 2.8%
(case 1a) to 9.6% (case 1e) of output. This happens because capital is mostly a￿ected in
generation 2. The fact that the epidemic is more severe in cases where skilled people are
a￿ected harder has been explained above. After the second generation output stabilizes
and by generation 10, the e￿ect ranges from 3.6% to 9.4% of output. These results are
very similar to Cuddington and Hancock (1995).
Scenario 3 is qualitative similar to scenario 1. However, since the overall infection
probability is much higher (20%), the e￿ects are much larger. In generation 1, output
decreases by 3.8% for case 3a and 9% for case 3e. In the long-run output will settle from
10.5% to 27.4% below the no-AIDS scenario. The variability across cases is alarming
and suggests that the long-run e￿ects of AIDS are very sensitive to how the disease
is distributed across skills. The magnitude of these results are very much in line with
Cuddington (1993a), Cuddington (1993b), Botswana Institute for Development Policy
Analysis (2000), and Arndt (2003). As explained above, the fact that the results are
very sensitive to the prevalence across skills can be attributed to physical capital ac-
cumulation. Whenever, the epidemic is more prevalent among skilled individuals, and
given that these individuals are the greatest contributors to saving, physical capital will
be very much a￿ected if a larger proportion of these individuals are sick.
Figures 6 and 7 display the di￿erence in output between each case under scenarios
1 and 3 and the no AIDS case relative to the di￿erence in output between the case
where AIDS incidence is the same across skills and the no AIDS case 6. Two conclusions
6This metric was not calculated for scenarios 2 and 4 because the epidemic is temporary and therefore
16stems from these ￿gures; ￿rst the e￿ect of the epidemic varies signi￿cantly across cases
as case (a) in both scenarios lies 60% above the benchmark (case (c)), while case (e)
lies 40% below the benchmark case. Second, it appears that changing the overall level
of infection does not introduce signi￿cant variations across cases, that is, both ￿gures
are very much alike with respect to shape and magnitudes.
Another way to compare the di￿erence between each case for every scenario relative
to the no AIDS case is to compute the total sum of squared di￿erences (TSS) between
the output generated in each case and the output under the no AIDS case and compare
the magnitude of the value across cases. Table 6 has these results for scenarios 1 to 4.
In every scenario, there is a monotonic increasing relationship between TSS and cases.
That is, increasing the AIDS prevalence among skilled relative to unskilled people,
increases the magnitude of the e￿ect of AIDS on output.
Scenarios 2 and 4 behaves exactly like scenarios 1 and 3 for the ￿rst 2 generations
after the start of the epidemic. Since in these scenarios, the disease no longer exists
after 2 generations, they can be used to assess how long it would take for recovery. In
both scenarios, recovery starts in generation 3, however, very modestly. This is due to
the fact that the accumulation of physical capital will only signi￿cantly increase during
generation 4 because it takes one generation for a reduction in π to a￿ect physical
capital (see equation 20). It will be between generations 4 and 5 that in most cases
output will have almost recovered. Assuming each generation is about 20 years, this
model indicates that it would take sub-Sahara Africa between 80 to 100 years to recover.
Scenario 5, which imposes the hypothesis that the epidemic switches from being
higher among skilled to being higher among unskilled individuals, suggests that while
infection rates are still low and mainly a￿ecting skilled workers, output will be 1.9%
lower. The greatest e￿ect will be felt during generation 2, with output 7.7% below the
no-AIDS scenario. The economy starts to recover after that and, similarly to scenarios
2 and 4, would take 5 generations for the economy to recover.
In order to understand each scenario in more detail, it is important to investigate
how each a￿ected variable a￿ects output in the advent of the epidemic, that is, in which
direction and in what strength will output move as skilled labor, unskilled labor, and
capital is a￿ected by AIDS.
after 5 generations, the ratio cannot be calculated as both the numerator and denominator become zero.
17Given the calibrated parameters, the steady state wage rate of skilled workers is
greater than the steady state wage rate of unskilled workers, that is, w1
ss > w2
ss. Also, it
is easy to verify that around the steady state rss > w1





implies that changes in capital provide the greatest contribution to output, followed by
skilled labor and unskilled labor respectively.
In the model, AIDS a￿ects the economy through π1 > 0 and/or π2 > 0; hence,
it is important to understand how changes in these parameters a￿ect the factors of
production. Since the e￿ects of AIDS on all of the aggregate variables and wages either
increase or decrease as one moves from case (a) to (e), that is, the relationship is
monotonic with respect to cases; there is no need to show the transition paths for all
￿ve cases, therefore I only report the transition paths for the two extreme cases where
AIDS only a￿ects skilled or unskilled individuals and the case where AIDS prevalence is
the same across skills. I have also chosen not to report the transition paths for scenarios
3 and 4 since the results would only change in levels. Hence, without loss of generality,
tables 4 and 5 shows the transition paths of all aggregate variables and wages after the
AIDS shock for cases (a), (c), and (e) of scenarios 1 and 2. These tables can assist in
disentangling the e￿ects of AIDS on output.
It is easy to verify that there are two channels at which π1 a￿ects L1. A direct
channel and an indirect channel, through H1, given by equations (8) and (12) respec-
tively. However, these e￿ects will come at di￿erent generations since H1 will only be
a￿ected in the following period since aggregate human capital today is only a￿ected by
yesterday’s infection probabilities. This implies that a one time increase in π1 decreases
skilled labor for 2 generations. After the second generation, e￿ective skilled labor re-
turns to the same level as before the shock. In table 5, the reason why skilled labor
only returns to the same level as before the beginning of the epidemic in generation 4,
is because AIDS a￿ected the economy for 2 generations. Also, in table 4, skilled labor
never returns to the pre-AIDS level because the epidemic is present forever; however,
it adjusts to the new level by the second generation.
The equation determining e￿ective unskilled labor is more complicated because it
depends on both infection probabilities as well as e￿ective unskilled human capital,
which in turn depends on both π1 and π2. As with skilled labor, a one time change
in any infection probability will a￿ect unskilled labor for 2 generations. The direction
18of this e￿ect will depend on the distribution of AIDS prevalence across skills. For
the cases where AIDS only a￿ects unskilled individuals, e￿ective unskilled labor will
behave exactly the same way as skilled labor did in the explanation above. Whenever
AIDS only a￿ects skilled people, unskilled labor will increase for 2 generations and then
return back to the pre-AIDS level. During generation 1, an increase in π1 will increase
L2 because n1,h > n1,s, that is, children of infected skilled parents work more than
children from uninfected skilled parents. Also, the children from infected skilled workers
will increase aggregate unskilled human capital (equation 13) causing e￿ective unskilled
labor to increase in generation 2. The case in which both skills are a￿ected causes L2
to decrease in generation 1 as the e￿ect caused by Ψ2 < 1 dominates n1,h > n1,s, and
increase in generation 2 as the e￿ect of π1 on H2 is greater than the e￿ect of π2 on
H2. These results can be easily veri￿ed from equation (13). The behavior of L2 can be
veri￿ed for these three cases in tables 4 and 5 with the epidemic a￿ecting the economy
forever and for only 2 generations respectively.
Physical capital depends directly on the probability of infection π1 and π2 as well as
wages and aggregate human capital (equation 20). As with aggregate human capital,
it takes one generation for physical capital to be a￿ected by the epidemic. It is easy to
check that increases in infection probabilities and decreases in wages and human capital
will cause capital to decrease. Since it is never the case that all wages and all human
capital move in the same direction, it might not be possible to determine unambiguously
how capital moves after the AIDS shock. However, for the cases analyzed in this paper,
the e￿ect on capital of changes in infection probabilities always dominates any other
e￿ect; hence, capital will always decrease one generation after AIDS a￿ects the economy.
Also, since the model generates a skill premium in the order of 2, the proportion of
total savings that can be attributed to skilled workers is larger; therefore, capital will
be more greatly a￿ected whenever the epidemic hits skilled people more relative to
unskilled. This fact combined with the condition that changes in capital causes the
greatest changes in output, explains why in table 3 output is smaller for the cases
where the epidemic is more prevalent among skilled workers.
Note that a one time increase in the infection probability can cause capital to move
for more than 2 subsequent generations. That is, it takes longer for capital to adjust.
Tables 4 and 5 can help in assessing this ￿nding. Even though, in all of the scenarios
19investigated in this paper the probability of infection lasts for at least 2 generations,
skilled and unskilled labor either adjust to a new level or return to the pre-AIDS level
much faster than capital. The fact that there is a dynamic relationship between capital
and wages explains this behavior. Hence, once the epidemic begins, wages are a￿ected
because labor is a￿ected (equations 27 and 28). These wages will a￿ect capital next
period and capital next period will a￿ect wages in that same period, which in turn will
a￿ect capital in the subsequent period.
Two interconnected results stem from scenarios 2 and 4. First, it seems that even
though the epidemic will more greatly a￿ect output in cases where HIV infects skilled
workers more relative to unskilled, it will also recover faster in those cases. Second,
whenever the epidemic a￿ects skilled workers more relative to unskilled, output can
overshoot and stay for sometime above the no-AIDS scenario. These results can be
explained by looking at table 5 and observing the behavior of skilled wage, skilled
labor, skilled human capital, and physical capital for the case where π1 = 0.152 and
π2 = 0 . As the epidemic struck during generation 1, skilled labor fell pushing its
wage up. Skilled human capital and physical capital fell drastically by generation 2.
The decrease in H1 caused L1 to decrease even further, which pushed w1 even higher.
When the epidemic was over in generation 3, skilled labor recovered but not to the level
before AIDS since it would take one more generation for H1 to recover. This caused w1
to decrease, but to remain above its pre-AIDS level. Hence, physical capital increased
above its pre-AIDS level causing output to do the same. This does not happen in other
cases because the decrease in π1 is not large enough as to make capital jump as much
and have the skilled wage e￿ect large enough to dominate the unskilled wage e￿ect. It
is because of these dynamics that one can see output recovering faster and overshooting
in cases where more skilled workers are infected.
Sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to parameters Ψi, ∆, Bi,j, µ, and
φ; and all results were reported in tables 7 to 21. Overall, the results are not very
sensitive to the choice of most of these parameters.
The parameter Ψi measures the work productivity of an infected individual relative
to that of a healthy individual. Since the baseline model assumes Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.5, it
seems reasonable to investigate two issues. First, changes in Ψ1 and Ψ2 will be chosen
as to keep Ψ1 = Ψ2, but for levels not equal to 0.5. Second, Ψ1 will be chosen to be
20relativitily higher than Ψ2 in order to capture the possibility that skilled individuals are
more capable to treat themselves, hence, not losing as much in productivity compared
to a healthy individual. The parameter Ψ1 was chosen to range from 0.4 to 0.547, while
Ψ2 was chosen to vary from 0.4 to 0.5. Reducing the values of both Ψ1 and Ψ2 to 0.4
is consistent with the ￿ndings in Guinness and Alban (2000). All results are reported
on tables 7 to 9. All scenarios seems robust to the choice of Ψ1 and Ψ2 with maximum
variation for any given case in the order of 1 percentage point.
The results are also very robust to the choice of parameter ∆ (tables 10 to 12)
with maximum variation for any given case in the order of 1 percentage point. The
same result is true for di￿erent choices of the parameters Bij (tables 13 to 15), which
measures the e￿ciency of school training.
The results from sensitivity analysis performed on the parameter µ, which captures
the degree of substitutability between unskilled labor and the capital-skill aggregate,
are displayed in tables 16 to 18. The e￿ect of the epidemic on output is very insensitive
to µ in scenario 3 (table 18). In scenarios 1 and 2 (tables 16 and 17), the results only
become sensitive for µ values above 0.1. That is, for these large values, the e￿ect of
the epidemic on output presents almost no variation across all ￿ve cases. However,
increasing µ has a negative e￿ect on the skill premium. This is due to the fact that
around the steady state, the ratio between Q and L2 is less than one.8 Because the skill
premium falls below 2 as µ is set above 0.0295 and there is some evidence indicating that
in sub-Saharan Africa this premium should be between 2 and 5 (Mwabu and Schultz
(2000)), I can restrict the parameter µ to range between zero and 0.03. Therefore, for
this imposed range, the results are quite robust to the choice of µ.
Tables 19, 20, and 21 has the results for di￿erent φ values. This parameter captures
the degree of complementarity between capital and skilled labor. The results seems
very robust to the choice of φ values.
7I have restricted Ψ1 to 0.54 as to guarantee that n1,h > n1,s always happens.
8The skill premium w
1







L2)µ. Hence, whenever Q < L2, as µ
increases, the skill premium decreases.
215 Conclusion
This paper investigated the e￿ects of HIV/AIDS on steady state output for an economy
resembling sub-Sahara Africa with skill heterogeneity. Assuming di￿erent e￿ects of the
AIDS epidemic across skills, I ￿nd the results to be sensitive to the distribution of
the disease across skills. In a scenario where the overall infection rate is permanently
at 7%, output settles after generation 3 at 3.5% below steady state no-AIDS output
for the case where AIDS only a￿ects unskilled workers. This same result jumps to
10% whenever AIDS only a￿ects skilled workers. For any di￿erent combination of
infection probability across skills, the results are between the above numbers. Hence
the relationship between the e￿ect of AIDS on output and the distribution of AIDS
across skills is monotonic. For a similar scenario, where the overall probability was set
at 20%, the e￿ect of AIDS on output ranged from 10% to 28% after generation 3.
For scenarios where the epidemic is over after 2 generations, it takes between 4 to
5 generations for the economy to recover. Assuming each generation encompasses 20
years, this corresponds to a recovery time in the order of 80 to 100 years. Most of the
results were not sensitive to the choice of parameters.
There are some extensions of this paper that might be of some importance. First, one
might want to endogeneize the labor productivity parameters as to make it a function
of each individual demand for medication. This could potentially assist in answering
questions about governmental policy with respect to subsidy levels and its distribution
across skills and how could changes in these policies a￿ect output. Also, one could
endogeneize infection probabilities making them a function of some prevention policy
parameter. This could help answering questions about optimal governmental policy,
that is, what is the best combination of prevention and treatment in order to minimize
the e￿ect of the epidemic. I leave these questions for a di￿erent paper.
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25A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Review of the E￿ect of HIV/AIDS on Economic Growth
Paper Model Type Country/Region Result
Over (1992) Regression - 2 sectors 30 sub-Saharan African Annual GDP growth
0.56 to 1.47% lower
Kambou, Devarajan, and
Over (1992)
CGE - 11 sectors Cameroon Annual GDP growth 0
to 1.9% lower
Cuddington (1993a) Solow type Tanzania GDP 15 to 25% smaller
Cuddington (1993b) Solow type - 2 sectors Tanzania GDP 15 to 25% smaller
Cuddington and Hancock
(1994)




Solow type - 2 sectors Malawi GDP 3 to 9% smaller
Bloom and Mahal (1997) Regression 51 countries worldwide Insigni￿cant e￿ect
on per capita income
growth
Bonnel (2000) Regression 50 African countries Annual GDP growth 0.7
to 1.1% lower
Arndt and Lewis (2000) CGE South Africa Annual GDP growth 2.6
percentage points lower
BIDPA (2000) CGE and Solow type Botswana Overall economy 24 to
38% smaller
World Bank (2000) Solow type Lesotho Annual GDP growth
0.8% lower
World Bank (2001) Solow type Swaziland Annual GDP growth
1.5% lower




Regression - panel data 41 African countries GDP growth 2 to 4%
smaller
Arndt (2003) CGE Mozambique GDP 14 to 20% smaller
Bell (2003) OLG - calibration South Africa Possible economic col-




OLG - calibration Sub-Sahara Africa Long-run GDP growth 0
to 10% lower
26Table 2: Calibrated Parameter Values for Baseline Model
Parameter Value Data Moment Source
Preferences
α1 = 1 Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
α2 = 0.4 Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
α3 = 1 Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
α4 = 0.2 Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
θ = 0.05 Private health care expenditure Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
ρ = −0.5 Private health care expenditure Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
Taxes
τ1 = τ2 = 0.2 Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
Production Function
η = 0.23 Factors income share Gollin (2002)
δ = 0.45 Factors income share Gollin (2002)
µ = 0.01 Wage skill premium Fallon and Layard (1975)
φ = −0.025 Wage skill premium Fallon and Layard (1975)
Labor Productivity
Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.5 Proportion sick days due to AIDS Cuddington (1993a)
∆ = 0.15 Relative wage income from child labor Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005)
27Table 3: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for all Scenarios
under the Baseline Calibration
Scenario 1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.84 92.80 92.79 92.78
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 90.51 90.55 90.57 90.57
Scenario 2
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 99.99
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 93.50 100.35 100.13 100
Scenario 3
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.356 100 96.22 91.72 90.32 89.81 89.63 89.52
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.269 100 95.17 88.03 87.30 87.03 86.94 86.88
π1 = π2 = 0.20 100 93.80 83.15 82.96 82.89 82.86 82.85
π1 = 0.295, π2 = 0.10 100 92.71 78.48 78.79 78.90 78.94 78.97
π1 = 0.41, π2 = 0 100 91.01 71.44 72.19 72.46 72.56 72.61
Scenario 4
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.356 100 96.22 91.72 93.87 97.97 99.26 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.269 100 95.17 88.03 91.73 98.69 99.52 100
π1 = π2 = 0.20 100 93.80 83.15 88.45 99.64 99.87 100
π1 = 0.295, π2 = 0.10 100 92.71 78.48 84.99 101.07 100.39 100
π1 = 0.41, π2 = 0 100 91.01 71.44 79.33 103.23 101.16 100
Scenario 5
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
AIDS 100 98.10 92.33 94.24 98.80 99.56 100
28Table 4: Transition Paths after AIDS shock for all Aggregate Variables and
Wages under Scenario 1 (all variables normalized to 100 at t = 0)
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
Y
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 90.51 90.55 90.57 90.57
L1
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 96.50 89.75 89.75 89.75 89.75 89.75
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 92.40 78.36 78.36 78.36 78.36 78.36
L2
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 94.46 93.74 93.74 93.74 93.74 93.74
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.02 103.01 103.01 103.01 103.01 103.01
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100.06 114.37 114.37 114.37 114.37 114.37
K
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 96.16 94.85 94.38 94.21 94.12
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100 94.17 93.60 93.39 93.32 93.28
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100 91.50 91.81 91.92 91.96 91.98
w1
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.70 97.11 96.62 96.45 96.38 96.34
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 101.45 105.07 104.83 104.74 104.72 104.70
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 104.86 115.51 115.65 115.70 115.72 115.73
w2
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 104.43 103.60 103.10 102.92 102.85 102.82
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100.85 91.59 91.40 91.33 91.30 91.29
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.79 79.24 79.33 79.36 79.37 79.38
H1
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100 93.00 93.00 93.00 93.00 93.00
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100 84.80 84.80 84.80 84.80 84.80
H2
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 99.24 99.24 99.24 99.24 99.24
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100 106.17 106.17 106.17 106.17 106.17
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100 114.30 114.30 114.30 114.30 114.30
29Table 5: Transition Paths after AIDS shock for all Aggregate Variables and
Wages under Scenario 2 (all variables normalized to 100 at t = 0)
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
Y
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 93.50 100.35 100.13 100
L1
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 96.50 89.75 93.00 100 100 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 92.40 78.36 84.80 100 100 100
L2
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 94.46 93.74 99.24 100 100 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.02 103.01 106.17 100 100 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100.06 114.37 114.30 100 100 100
K
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 96.16 94.85 98.17 99.33 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100 94.17 93.60 99.16 99.70 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100 91.50 91.81 100.99 100.36 100
w1
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.70 97.11 97.90 99.32 99.75 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 101.45 105.07 103.34 99.69 99.89 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 104.86 115.51 110.29 100.36 100.13 100
w2
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 104.43 103.60 98.73 99.35 99.76 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100.85 91.59 90.63 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.79 79.24 81.96 100.35 100.13 100
H1
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100 93.00 93.00 100 100 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100 84.80 84.80 100 100 100
H2
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 100 99.24 99.24 100 100 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 100 106.17 106.17 100 100 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 100 114.30 114.30 100 100 100
30Table 6: Total Sum of Squares for Every Case under Scenarios 1 to 4 Relative
to no AIDS Case
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Case TSS TSS
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 0.00131 0.00007
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 0.00235 0.00015
π1 = π2 = 0.07 0.00380 0.00027
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 0.00542 0.00041
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 0.00930 0.00075
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Case TSS TSS
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.356 0.0111 0.00065
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.269 0.0177 0.00123
π1 = π2 = 0.20 0.0306 0.00236
π1 = 0.295, π2 = 0.10 0.0463 0.00385
π1 = 0.41, π2 = 0 0.0788 0.00693
31Table 7: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 1 with
Di￿erent Ψi Values
Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.4
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.44 96.53 96.12 95.98 95.92 95.89
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 97.95 95.08 94.81 94.71 94.68 94.66
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.45 93.56 93.43 93.38 93.36 93.36
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.00 92.17 92.17 92.17 92.17 92.17
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.18 89.56 89.78 89.86 89.89 89.90
Baseline: Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.5
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.84 92.80 92.79 92.78
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 90.51 90.55 90.57 90.57
Ψ1 = 0.54 and Ψ2 = 0.4
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.44 96.53 96.12 95.98 95.92 95.89
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.14 95.37 95.06 94.95 94.91 94.89
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.84 94.12 93.92 93.84 93.82 93.81
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.57 92.97 92.86 92.82 92.81 92.80
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.06 90.74 90.80 90.83 90.84 90.84
Ψ1 = 0.54 and Ψ2 = 0.5
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.33 95.82 95.48 95.35 95.30 95.28
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.97 94.42 94.20 94.12 94.09 94.07
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.65 93.15 93.03 92.99 92.98 92.97
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.06 90.74 90.80 90.83 90.83 90.84
32Table 8: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 2 with
Di￿erent Ψi Values
Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.4
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.44 96.53 97.65 99.44 99.80 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 97.95 95.08 96.80 99.60 99.85 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.45 93.56 95.88 99.81 99.93 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.00 92.17 95.02 100.02 100.01 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.18 89.56 93.35 100.47 100.17 100
Baseline: Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.5
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 99.99
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 93.50 100.35 100.13 100
Ψ1 = 0.54 and Ψ2 = 0.4
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.44 96.53 97.65 99.44 99.80 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.14 95.37 96.86 99.55 99.84 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.84 94.12 96.00 99.71 99.90 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.57 92.97 95.18 99.90 99.96 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.06 90.74 93.55 100.31 100.11 100
Ψ1 = 0.54 and Ψ2 = 0.5
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.33 95.82 97.10 99.48 99.81 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.97 94.42 96.16 99.68 99.88 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.65 93.15 95.28 99.88 99.96 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.06 90.74 93.55 100.31 100.11 100
33Table 9: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 5 with
Di￿erent Ψi Values
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.4 100 97.74 91.33 93.29 98.99 99.63 100
Baseline: Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0.5 100 98.10 92.33 94.24 98.80 99.56 100
Ψ1 = 0.54 and Ψ2 = 0.4 100 98.19 91.79 93.37 98.91 99.60 100
Ψ1 = 0.54 and Ψ2 = 0.5 100 98.23 92.46 94.26 98.78 99.55 100
34Table 10: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 1
with Di￿erent ∆ Values
∆ = 0.05
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.45 96.60 96.16 96.00 95.94 95.91
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.10 95.31 94.92 94.78 94.72 94.69
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.74 93.94 93.60 93.48 93.44 93.41
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.43 92.68 92.40 92.30 92.26 92.24
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.83 90.31 90.12 90.05 90.02 90.00
∆ = 0.1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.57 96.89 96.43 96.26 96.20 96.16
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.19 95.54 95.17 95.04 94.99 94.96
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.80 94.11 93.84 93.74 93.71 93.69
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.46 92.81 92.63 92.56 92.54 92.52
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.82 90.36 90.32 90.31 90.30 90.30
Baseline: ∆ = 0.15
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.84 92.80 92.79 92.78
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 90.51 90.55 90.57 90.57
∆ = 0.2
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.78 97.38 96.90 96.73 96.67 96.63
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.34 95.93 95.62 95.51 95.47 95.45
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.90 94.40 94.27 94.22 94.20 94.19
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.51 93.02 92.03 93.03 93.03 93.03
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.80 90.45 90.69 90.77 90.81 90.82
∆ = 0.3
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.93 97.78 97.32 97.15 97.09 97.06
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.45 96.25 96.02 95.93 95.90 95.88
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.97 94.64 94.63 94.63 94.63 94.63
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.55 93.20 93.37 93.44 93.46 93.47
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.78 90.51 90.99 91.17 91.23 91.27
35Table 11: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 2
with Di￿erent ∆ Values
∆ = 0.05
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.44 96.60 97.68 99.39 99.78 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.10 95.31 96.76 99.43 99.79 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.74 93.94 95.77 99.51 99.82 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.43 92.68 94.84 99.63 99.86 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.83 90.31 93.06 99.90 99.96 100
∆ = 0.1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.58 96.89 97.82 99.36 99.77 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.19 95.54 96.92 99.46 99.80 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.80 94.11 95.95 99.61 99.86 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.46 92.81 95.04 99.77 99.92 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.82 90.36 93.29 100.14 100.05 100
Baseline: ∆ = 0.15
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 99.99
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 93.50 100.35 100.13 100
∆ = 0.2
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.78 97.38 98.10 99.34 99.76 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.34 95.93 97.24 99.54 99.83 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.90 94.40 96.29 99.80 99.93 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.51 93.02 95.41 100.05 100.02 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.80 90.45 93.68 100.55 100.20 100
∆ = 0.3
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.93 97.78 98.37 99.36 99.77 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.45 96.25 97.53 99.65 99.87 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.97 94.64 96.60 99.97 99.99 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.55 93.20 95.72 100.29 100.11 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.78 90.51 94.02 100.91 100.33 100
36Table 12: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 5
with Di￿erent ∆ Values
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
∆ = 0.05 100 98.08 91.62 93.25 98.67 99.51 100
∆ = 0.1 100 98.09 92.00 93.76 98.72 99.53 100
Baseline: ∆ = 0.15 100 98.10 92.33 94.24 98.80 99.56 100
∆ = 0.2 100 98.12 92.60 94.68 98.89 99.59 100
∆ = 0.3 100 98.13 93.05 95.47 99.09 99.67 100
37Table 13: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 1
with Di￿erent Bi,j Values
Baseline: B1,h = B1,s = B2,h = B2,s = 1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.84 92.80 92.79 92.78
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 90.51 90.55 90.57 90.57
B1,h = 1 and B1,s = B2,h = B2,s = 0.90
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.15 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.84 92.80 92.79 92.79
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.40 90.51 90.55 90.56 90.57
B1,h = 1 and B1,s = B2,h = B2,s = 0.75
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.15 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.28 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.94
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.83 92.80 92.79 92.78
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.40 90.51 90.55 90.56 90.57
B1,h = B2,h = 1 and B1,s = B2,s = 0.50
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 95.73 95.45 95.35 95.31 95.29
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 94.34 94.17 94.11 94.09 94.08
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 92.87 92.83 92.81 92.80 92.80
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 91.55 91.60 91.62 91.63 91.63
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 89.06 89.28 89.36 89.39 89.41
B1,h = 1, B2,h = 0.90,B1,s = 0.50, and B2,s = 0.45
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 95.73 95.45 95.35 95.32 95.29
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 94.38 94.21 94.15 94.12 94.11
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 92.95 92.90 92.88 92.87 92.86
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 91.66 91.70 91.72 91.72 91.72
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 89.21 89.42 89.49 89.52 89.54
38Table 14: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 2
with Di￿erent Bi,j Values
Baseline: B1,h = B1,s = B2,h = B2,s = 1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 99.99
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 93.50 100.35 100.13 100
B1,h = 1 and B1,s = B2,h = B2,s = 0.90
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.15 97.96 99.34 99.76 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.40 93.49 100.35 100.13 100
B1,h = 1 and B1,s = B2,h = B2,s = 0.75
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.15 97.96 99.34 99.76 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.28 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.40 93.49 100.35 100.13 100
B1,h = B2,h = 1 and B1,s = B2,s = 0.50
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 95.73 96.72 99.65 99.87 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 94.34 95.83 99.76 99.91 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 92.87 94.86 99.93 99.97 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 91.55 93.97 100.11 100.04 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 89.06 92.22 100.49 100.18 100
B1,h = 1, B2,h = 0.90,B1,s = 0.50, and B2,s = 0.45
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 95.73 96.72 99.65 99.87 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 94.38 95.86 99.76 99.91 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 92.95 94.93 99.92 99.97 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 91.66 94.06 100.09 100.03 100













































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 16: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 1
with Di￿erent µ Values
µ = 0.005
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.16 96.68 96.51 96.45 96.42
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.29 95.74 95.41 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 94.25 94.05 93.98 93.95 93.93
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.90 92.81 92.78 92.77 92,76
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.37 90.47 90.51 90.52 90.53
Baseline: µ = 0.01
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.84 92.80 92.79 92.78
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 90.51 90.55 90.57 90.57
µ = 0.1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.58 96.95 96.46 96.29 96.23 96.20
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.21 95.74 95.40 95.29 95.24 95.22
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.83 94.47 94.28 94.21 94.19 94.17
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.50 93.31 93.24 93.22 93.21 93.20
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.89 91.11 91.25 91.30 91.32 91.32
µ = 0.25
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.40 96.63 96.13 95.97 95.91 95.89
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.10 95.75 95.42 95.31 95.27 95.26
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.80 94.82 94.66 94.60 94.59 94.58
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.53 93.97 93.94 93.94 93.93 93.93
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.03 92.33 92.53 92.60 92.62 92.63
µ = 0.5
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.10 96.12 95.63 95.49 95.44 95.43
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 97.91 95.79 95.50 95.41 95.39 95.38
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.73 95.44 95.34 95.31 95.30 95.30
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.58 95.12 95.17 95.19 95.19 95.19
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.27 94.43 94.74 94.83 94.86 94.87
41Table 17: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 2
with Di￿erent µ Values
µ = 0.005
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.16 97.97 99.34 99.76 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.28 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.86 94.25 96.11 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.90 95.21 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.37 93.46 100.35 100.13 100
Baseline: µ = 0.01
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 99.99
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 93.50 100.35 100.13 100
µ = 0.1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10|
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.58 96.95 97.85 99.33 99.77 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.21 95.74 97.15 99.50 99.83 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.83 94.47 96.37 99.72 99.90 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.50 93.31 95.63 99.94 99.98 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.89 91.11 94.16 100.39 100.14 100
µ = 0.25
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.40 96.63 97.70 99.33 99.78 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.10 95.75 97.28 99.53 99.85 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.80 94.82 96.80 99.76 99.92 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.53 93.97 96.32 100 100 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.03 92.33 95.31 100.46 100.15 100
µ = 0.5
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.10 96.12 97.50 99.37 99.82 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 97.91 95.79 97.56 99.60 99.89 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.73 95.44 97.57 99.86 99.96 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.58 95.12 97.52 100.10 100.03 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.27 94.43 97.29 100.57 100.16 100
42Table 18: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 5
with Di￿erent µ Values
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
µ = 0.005 100 98.10 92.32 94.24 98.80 99.56 100
Baseline: µ = 0.01 100 98.10 92.33 94.24 98.80 99.56 100
µ = 0.1 100 98.13 92.38 94.22 98.79 99.57 100
µ = 0.25 100 98.16 92.46 94.23 98.80 99.61 100
µ = 0.5 100 98.23 92.59 94.35 98.89 99.68 100
43Table 19: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 1
with Di￿erent φ Values
φ = −0.01
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.18 96.73 96.58 96.52 96.49
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.26 95.74 95.42 95.31 95.27 95.24
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.83 94.22 94.03 93.96 93.94 93.92
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.45 92.85 92.76 92.73 92.72 92.72
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.76 90.28 90.38 90.41 90.42 90.43
Baseline: φ = −0.025
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 96.67 96.50 96.44 96.40
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 95.40 95.28 95.24 95.21
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 94.06 93.99 93.96 93.95
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 92.84 92.80 92.79 92.78
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 90.51 90.55 90.57 90.57
φ = −0.04
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.11 96.61 96.42 96.35 96.31
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.28 95.75 95.39 95.26 95.21 95.18
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.88 94.31 94.10 94.02 93.99 93.97
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.52 93.00 92.91 92.88 92.87 92.86
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.86 90.54 90.66 90.70 90.72 90.73
φ = −0.1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 96.94 96.31 96.05 95.93 95.85
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.33 95.76 95.32 95.13 95.05 94.99
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.98 94.50 94.24 94.14 94.09 94.06
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.66 93.34 93.25 93.21 93.19 91.18
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.08 91.12 91.30 91.38 91.41 91.43
44Table 20: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 2
with Di￿erent φ Values
φ = −0.01
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.18 98.02 99.39 99.78 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.26 95.74 97.11 99.53 99.83 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.83 94.22 96.11 99.72 99.90 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.45 92.85 95.19 99.92 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.76 90.28 93.40 100.33 100.12 100
Baseline: φ = −0.025
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.14 97.96 99.34 99.76 99.99
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.27 95.74 97.08 99.50 99.82 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.85 94.26 96.12 99.70 99.89 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.49 92.92 95.23 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.81 90.41 93.50 100.35 100.13 100
φ = −0.04
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 97.11 97.90 99.30 99.74 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.28 95.75 97.06 99.47 99.80 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.88 94.31 96.14 99.69 99.88 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.52 93.00 95.28 99.91 99.97 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 96.86 90.54 93.60 100.38 100.14 100
φ = −0.1
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
π1 = 0, π2 = 0.129 100 98.69 96.94 97.60 99.08 99.61 100
π1 = 0.035, π2 = 0.10 100 98.33 95.73 96.93 99.31 99.71 100
π1 = π2 = 0.07 100 97.98 94.50 96.19 99.61 99.83 100
π1 = 0.10, π2 = 0.044 100 97.66 93.34 95.48 99.90 99.96 100
π1 = 0.152, π2 = 0 100 97.08 91.12 94.06 100.50 100.21 100
45Table 21: Output Levels Relative to no AIDS Scenario (in %) for Scenario 5
with Di￿erent φ Values
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
no AIDS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
φ = −0.01 100 98.08 92.27 94.29 98.86 99.60 100
Baseline: φ = −0.025 100 98.10 92.33 94.24 98.80 99.56 100
φ = −0.04 100 98.13 92.38 94.18 98.73 99.52 100
φ = −0.1 100 98.25 92.62 93.92 98.41 99.32 99.99
46Figure 1: Skill Premium under Every Case for Scenario 1 before and after the
AIDS Epidemic
Figure 2: Skill Premium under Every Case for Scenario 2 before and after the
AIDS Epidemic
47Figure 3: Skill Premium under Every Case for Scenario 3 before and after the
AIDS Epidemic
Figure 4: Skill Premium under Every Case for Scenario 4 before and after the
AIDS Epidemic
48Figure 5: Skill Premium for Scenario 5 before and after the AIDS Epidemic
Figure 6: Di￿erence Between no AIDS Output and Each Case Relative to Dif-
ference Between no AIDS Output and Case c under Scenario 1
49Figure 7: Di￿erence Between no AIDS Output and Each Case Relative to Dif-
ference Between no AIDS Output and Case c under Scenario 3
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